Beschreibung:
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and boundedrationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings intofocus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessonsfrom that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.Boundedrationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentiveprovisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, thepower of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts inmulticultural environments. The introduction of social norms to boundedrationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts andmechanism design.This book makes an important contribution to thestudy of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strandsof research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailedanalysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
Chapter 1 Preface.- Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality.- Chapter 2 Introduction.- Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design.- Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design.- Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality.- Chapter 6 Conclusions.- Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design.- Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship.- Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems.- Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment.- Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.