Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi
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ISBN-13:
9783319292533
Veröffentl:
2016
Einband:
HC runder Rücken kaschiert
Erscheinungsdatum:
02.05.2016
Seiten:
308
Autor:
Federico Quartieri
Gewicht:
629 g
Format:
241x160x23 mm
Serie:
Springer Series in Game Theory
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.
Presents a state-of-the-art collection of studies on oligopoly theory
Introduction.- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi.- Cournot, aNon-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with MonotoneBest Responses.- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in AggregativeGames: an Expository Treatment.- On the Geometric Structure of the CournotEquilibrium Set: the Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs.- PureStrategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application toSymmetric Discrete Cournot Games.- On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly.Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: the Exponential Model.Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy.- CournotOligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets.- Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly.EvolutionaryOligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities.- ExistenceUniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests.- Two-Group Contests withCommunication Within and Between Groups.- On the Nash Equilibrium of AsymmetricPublic-Good Contests.- Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-SeekingInnovation, and Patent-Race Games.

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