This book explores the thought of Alexius Meinong, a philosopher known for his unconventional theory of reference and predication. The chapters cover a natural progression of topics, beginning with the origins of Gegenstandstheorie, Meinong's theory of objects, and his discovery of assumptions as a fourth category of mental states to supplement his teacher Franz Brentano's references to presentations, feelings, and judgments.

Preface (with Acknowledgments).- Introduction: Meinong and Philosophical Analysis.- Chapter 1. Meinong's Life and Philosophy.- Chapter 2. Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intended Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong.- Chapter 3. Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption.- Chapter 4. Außersein of the Pure Object.- Chapter 5.  Constitutive (Nuclear) and Extraconstitutive (Extranuclear) Properties.- Chapter 6. Meditations on Meinong's Golden Mountain.- Chapter 7. Domain Comprehension in Meinongian Object Theory.- Chapter 8. Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Non-Being.- Chapter 9. About Nothing.- Chapter 10. Tarski's Quantificational Semantics and Meinongian Object Theory Domains.- Chapter 11. Reflections on Mally's Heresy.- Chapter 12. Virtual Relations and Meinongian Abstractions.- Chapter 13. Truth and Fiction in Lewis's Critique of Meinongian Semantics.- Chapter 14. Anti-Meinongian Actualist Meaning of Fiction in Kripke's 1973 John Locke Lectures.- Chapter 15. Metaphysics of Meinongian Aesthetic Value.- Chapter 16. Quantum Indeterminacy and Physical Reality as a Relevantly Predicationally Incomplete Existent Entity.-Chapter 17. Confessions of a Meinongian Logician.- Chapter 18.  Meinongian Dark Ages and Renaissance.- Appendix:  Object Theory Logic and Mathematics - Two Essays by Ernst Mally (Translation and Critical Commentary).- Notes.- References.- Index.