Coverage includes such topics as a knowledge-first account of defeasible reasoning, felicitous falsehoods, the possibility of foundationalist justification, the many formal faces of defeat, radical scepticism, and more.

Part I: Knowledge.- Chapter 1. Reflective Knowledge (Ernest Sosa).- Chapter 2. Epistemically Useful Falsehoods (Catherine Z. Elgin).- Chapter 3. Theoretical Unity in Epistemology (Jonathan L. Kvanvig).- Chapter 4. Accurate Enough, Comprehensive Enough, and Reasonable Enough Belief (Richard Foley).- Chapter 5. Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary (Rodrigo Borges).- Chapter 6. A Causal Aspect of Epistemic Basing (Robert K. Shope).- Part II: Scepticism.- Chapter 7. The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism (Linda Zagzebski).- Chapter 8. Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism (Sharon Ryan).- Chapter 9. Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination (Claudio de Almeida).- Part III: Justification.- Chapter 10. Finite Minds (Michael Huemer).- Chapter 11. Finite Minds and Open Minds (Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson).- Chapter 12. Some Notes on the Possibility of Foundationalist Justification (Sanford C. Goldberg).- Chapter 13. A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat (Matthew Kotzen).- Chapter 14: Benign Infinity (Matthias Steup).