H.L.A. Hart is among the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, with an especially great influence on the philosophy of law. His 1961 book The Concept of Law has become an enduring classic of legal philosophy, and has also left a significant imprint on moral and political philosophy.In this volume, leading contemporary legal and political philosopher Matthew H. Kramer provides a crystal-clear analysis of Hart's contributions to our understanding of the nature of law. He elucidates and scrutinizes every major aspect of Hart's jurisprudential thinking, ranging from his general methodology to his defense of legal positivism. He shows how Hart's achievement in The Concept of Law, despite the evolution of debates in subsequent decades, remains central to contemporary legal philosophy because it lends itself to being reinterpreted in light of new concerns and interests. Kramer therefore pays particular attention to the strength of Hart's insights in the context of present-day disputes among philosophers over the reality of normative entities and properties and over the semantics of normative statements.This book is an invaluable guide to Hart's thought for students and scholars of legal philosophy and jurisprudence, as well as moral and political philosophy.

Preface vii1 A Discourse on Method 11 Posing the questions 22 Elucidation of a concept 43 A method of central instances 54 A philosophical scope 85 Variations across societies 116 A descriptive-explanatory methodology 127 A reductionist ambition? 238 A naturalistic ambition? 282 Hart on Legal Powers and Law's Normativity 321 The Austinian model of law 332 Power-conferring laws 363 Legislators bound 524 Custom-derived laws 535 Limits on sovereignty 563 The Components of Hart's Jurisprudential Theory 601 The internal/external distinction 612 The simulative point of view 653 The blurring of distinctions between viewpoints 684 Primary norms and secondary norms: the general distinction 705 Primary norms and secondary norms: Hart's thought-experiment 746 The Rule of Recognition: to whom is it addressed? 787 The Rule of Recognition: power-conferring and duty-imposing 818 The unity of the Rule of Recognition: disagreements over details 849 The unity of the Rule of Recognition: multiple criteria 8510 The unity of the Rule of Recognition: institutional hierarchies 8811 The ultimacy of the Rule of Recognition 9112 The Rule of Recognition: the foundational level and the codified level 9213 The intertwining of the Rule of Recognition and other secondary norms 9714 Interdependent but distinct: a riposte to Shapiro 9915 Interdependent but distinct: a riposte to Waldron 10116 Interdependent but distinct: a riposte to MacCormick 10317 The problem of circularity 10518 Necessary and sufficient conditions 1074 Hart on Legal Interpretation and Legal Reasoning 1101 Crucial distinctions 1122 Hart on formalism and rule-skepticism 1335 Law and Morality 1481 Separability theses 1492 Hart on the minimum content of natural law 1643 Inclusive versus Exclusive Positivism 1734 Hart as an expressivist? 1806 Conclusion 204Notes 207References 215Index 222