Beschreibung:
Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune-and even hostile-to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform and opening. This book captures the effects of sanctions and inducements on North Korea and provides a detailed reconstruction of the role of economic incentives in the bargaining around the country's nuclear program.
1. Introduction: The Political Economy of Engagement2. The Political Economy of North Korea: The Paradigmatic Hard Target3. North Korea's External Economic Relations, 1990-20164. Humanitarian Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Food5. The Microeconomics of Engagement6. Negotiating on Nuclear Weapons I: The Rise and Fall of the Six Party Talks (2001-2008)7. Negotiating on Nuclear Weapons II: Permanent Crisis, 2009-20168. Conclusion: Whither North Korea? Whither Economic Statecraft?