Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction focuses on the development of game theory, taking into consideration empirical research, theoretical formulations, and research procedures involved. The book proceeds with a discussion on the theory of one-person games. The individual decision that a player makes in these kinds of games is noted as influential as to the outcome of these games. This discussion is followed by a presentation of pure coordination games and minimal situation. The ability of players to anticipate the choices of others to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome is emphasized. A favorable social situation is also influential in these kinds of games. The text moves forward by presenting studies on various kinds of competitive games. The research studies presented are coupled with empirical evidence and discussion designed to support the claims that are pointed out. The book also discusses several kinds of approaches in the study of games. Voting as a way to resolve multi-person games is also emphasized, including voting procedures, the preferences of voters, and voting strategies. The book is a valuable source of data for readers and scholars who are interested in the exploration of game theories.

Background 1 Introduction 1.1 Intuitive Background 1.2 Abstract Models: Basic Terminology 1.3 Skill, Chance, and Strategy 1.4 Historical Background 1.5 Summary 2 One-Person Games 2.1 Games Against Nature 2.2 Certainty 2.3 Risk 2.4 Utility Theory 2.5 Uncertainty 2.6 Summary 3 Pure Coordination Games and the Minimal Social Situation 3.1 Strategic Collaboration 3.2 Pure Coordination Games 3.3 The Minimal Social Situation 3.4 SummaryTheory and Empirical Evidence 4 Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games 4.1 Strictly Competitive Games 4.2 Extensive and Normal Forms 4.3 Games with Saddle-Points 4.4 Games without Saddle-Points 4.5 Dominance and Admissibility 4.6 Methods for Finding Solutions 4.7 Ordinal Pay-offs and Incomplete Information 4.8 Summary 5 Experiments with Strictly Competitive Games 5.1 Ideas Behind Experimental Games 5.2 Review of Research on Non-Saddle-Point Games 5.3 Review of Research on Saddle-Point Games 5.4 Critic of Experimental Gaming 5.5 Experiment I: Abstract and Lifelike Strictly Competitive Games 5.6 Summary 6 Two-Person, Mixed-Motive Games: Informal Game Theory 6.1 Mixed-Motive Games 6.2 Classification of 2 x 2 Mixed-Motive Games 6.3 Leader 6.4 Battle of the Sexes 6.5 Chicken 6.6 Prisoner's Dilemma 6.7 Comparison of the Archetypal 2 x 2 Games 6.8 Meta-game Theory 6.9 Summary 7 Experiments With Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games 7.1 The Experimental Gaming Literature 7.2 Strategic Structure 7.3 Pay-offs and Incentives 7.4 Circumstances of Play 7.5 Responses to Programmed Strategies 7.6 Sex Differences 7.7 Attribution Effects 7.8 Investigations of Ecological Validity 7.9 Experiment II: Abstract and Lifelike Prisoner's Dilemma Games 7.10 Experiment III: Abstract and Lifelike Chicken Games 7.11 Summary 8 Multi-Person Games: Social Dilemmas 8.1 Multi-Person Game Theory 8.2 Non-Cooperative Games: Equilibrium Points 8.3 Cooperative Games: Characteristic Functions 8.4 Harold Pinter's "The Caretaker" 8.5 The Shapley Value 8.6 The Dollar Auction Game and the Concorde Fallacy 8.7 Multi-Person Prisoner's Dilemma 8.8 General Theory of Compound Games 8.9 Summary 9 Experiments with Coalition, Auction, & Social Dilemma Games 9.1 Multi-Person Experimental Games 9.2 Coalition Formation 9.3 Auction Games and Psychological Traps 9.4 N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma 9.5 Experiment IV: Abstract and Lifelike N-Person Prisoner's Dilemmas 9.6 SummaryApplications 10 Sincere Voting and Collective Choice Theory 10.1 Background 10.2 Alternatives, Voters, Preferences 10.3 Axioms Concerning Individual Preferences 10.4 Voting Procedures 10.5 Condorcet's Paradox 10.6 Probabilities of Cyclic Majorities 10.7 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 10.8 The Borda Effect 10.9 Summary 11 Strategic Voting 11.1 Optimal Voting Strategies 11.2 Historical Background 11.3 Insincere Voting and Equilibrium Points 11.4 The Classical Solution: Dominance and Admissibility 11.5 Sophisticated Voting 11.6 Anticipated Decisions and Multi-Stage Solutions 11.7 General Results on Strategic Voting 11.8 Is Strategic Voting Unfair 11.9 Empirical Evidence 11.10 Summary 12 Theory of Evolution: Strategic Aspects 12.1 Historical Background 12.2 Strategic Evolution 12.3 Animal Conflicts and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 12.4 An Improved Multi-Person Game Model 12.5 Empirical Evidence 12.6 Summary 13 Moral Philosophy and Practical Problems of Strategy 13.1 Game Theory and the Conduct of Life 13.2 Rationality and Self-Interest 13.3 Kant's Categorical Imperative 13.4 Rousseau's Social Contract 13.5 Evolution and Stability of Moral Principles 13.6 SummaryAppendix A: A Simple Proof of the Minimax Theorem A.l Introductory Remarks A.2 Preliminary Formalization A.3 The Minimax Theorem A.4 ProofReferencesIndex