Robert Almeder provides a comprehensive discussion and definitive refutation of our common conception of truth as a necessary condition for knowledge of the world, and to defend in detail an epistemic conception of truth without falling into the usual epistemological relativism or classical idealism in which all properties of the world turn out to be linguistic in nature and origin. There is no other book available that clearly and thoroughly defends the case for an epistemic conception of truth and also claims success in avoiding idealism or epistemological relativism.

PrefacePart 1: Rejecting Correspondence and All Non-Epistemic Theories of TruthChapter 1: IntroductionChapter 2: Minimal Requirements for an Adequate Theory of TruthChapter 3: Justification for Non-Vacuity and Reliability PrinciplesChapter 4: The Core of Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of TruthChapter 5: The Main Argument Against Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of TruthChapter 6: How the Main Argument Differs From Other Similar ArgumentsChapter 7: Forestalling Three Predictable Objections to the Main ArgumentChapter 8: Does the Main Argument ConfuseChapter 9: Does the Main Argument Require Abandoning Truth as a Goal?Chapter 10: An Objection from Common SenseChapter 11: The Objection from the Paradox of AnalysisChapter 12: A Proposed Reduction of the Main ArgumentPart 2: In Defense of the Epistemic Theory of TruthChapter 1: Preliminary Objections to the Epistemic Theory of TruthChapter 2: Other Objections to the Epistemic Theory of TruthChapter 3: ConclusionPart 3: Defeating SkepticismChapter 1: IntroductionChapter 2: The Moral of the Above TaxonomyChapter 3: Self-Defeating Skepticisms and the Strength of Global Weak SkepticismChapter 4: The Canonical Argument for Global Weak Skepticism and the Contextualist ResponseChapter 5: Other Critiques of ContextualismChapter 6: The Asymmetry Objection to the Argument from IgnoranceChapter 7: Global Weak Skepticism as an Inference to the Best ExplanationChapter 8: Is the Global Skepticism here Refuted Implied by the Main Argument?Part 4:ConclusionsChapter 1: The Main Problem and Future ProspectsChapter 2: Blind realism and the Non-Vacuity ObjectionChapter 3: Does Blind Realism Presuppose Non-Epistemic Truth?Chapter 4: The Fitch ObjectionBibliographyIndex