Philosophical accounts of childhood have tended to derive from Plato and Aristotle, who portrayed children (like women, animals, slaves, and the mob) as unreasonable and incomplete in terms of lacking formal and final causes and ends. Despite much rhetoric concerning either the sinfulness or purity of children (as in Puritanism and Romanticism respectively), the assumption that children are marginal has endured. Modern theories, including recent interpretations of neuroscience, have re-enforced this sense of children's incompleteness. This fascinating monograph seeks to overturn this philosophical tradition. It develops instead a "fully semiotic" perspective, arguing that in so far as children are no more or less interpreters of the world than adults, they are no more or less reasoning agents. This, the book shows, has radical implications, particularly for the question of how we seek to educate children. One Aristotelian legacy is the unquestioned belief that societies must educate the young irrespective of the latter's wishes. Another is that childhood must be grown out of and left behind.

Introduction: The conception of childhood Part I: The Aristotelian Heritage 1.1. How Anti-Aristotelian can one be? 1.2. Aristotle's debt to Plato 1.3. Aristotle: children as people in formation 1.4. Histories of childhood: footnotes to Aristotle? 1.5. Pessimism and sin: the Puritan child 1.6. Optimism and enlightenment: the liberal child 1.7. Trailing clouds of glory: the romantic child 1.8. The postmodern child: less than not much? Part II: A Fully Semiotic View of Childhood 2.1. Living as semiotic engagement 2.2. The meaning-making semiotic child 2.3 Learning and schooling: Dewey and beyond Part III: Education Reconsidered 3.1. The roots of compulsory schooling 3.2 The extension of the in-between years 3.3 Teaching for significant events: identity and non-identity Part IV: The Child in Society 4.1 The child and the law 4.2 Semiosis and social policy 4.3 Doing children justice References Index