Classifying Madness examines the conceptual foundations of the D.S.M., the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists world-wide. It will be of interest to both mental health professionals and to philosophers interested in classification in science. The D.S.M. has become extremely controversial, and the possibility that there may be philosophical difficulties with it has become a commonplace in the mental health literature. Classifying Madness offers mental health professionals an opportunity to explore suspicions that there might be conceptual problems with the D.S.M. For philosophers, this book aims to contribute to debates in the philosophy of science concerning natural kinds, the theory-ladenness of classification, and the effect of sociological factors in science. These issues are normally approached via a consideration of the natural sciences and, as will be seen, approaching them via a consideration of psychiatry helps shed new light on old problems.

This book is about the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (D.S.M.). The D.S.M. aims to list and describe all mental disorders, and is extremely influential in the US health system, international research and the pharmaceutical industry. The D.S.M. is important, but it is also controversial. The book offers a sustained philosophical critique of the D.S.M. that addresses concerns about its scientific basis, pressure from big business, and conceptual issues. The author sheds new light on longstanding problems, taking a critical but not antagonistic approach.

What is Mental Disorder?.- Are Mental Disorders Natural Kinds?.- The Problem of Theory-Ladenness.- The D.S.M. and Feedback in Applied Science.