For decades the European Union tried changing its institutions, but achieved only unsatisfying political compromises and modest, incremental treaty revisions. In late 2009, however, the EU was successfully reformed through the Treaty of Lisbon. Reforming the European Union examines how political leaders ratified this treaty against all odds and shows how this victory involved all stages of treaty reform negotiations--from the initial proposal to referendums in several European countries. The authors emphasize the strategic role of political leadership and domestic politics, and they use state-of-the-art methodology, applying a comprehensive data set for actors' reform preferences. They look at how political leaders reacted to apparent failures of the process by recreating or changing the rules of the game. While domestic actors played a significant role in the process, their influence over the outcome was limited as leaders ignored negative referendums and plowed ahead with intended reforms. The book's empirical analyses shed light on critical episodes: strategic agenda setting during the European Convention, the choice of ratification instrument, intergovernmental bargaining dynamics, and the reaction of the German Council presidency to the negative referendums in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland.

List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii

Acknowledgments xv

Introduction 1

Chapter One: From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player AnalysisBy George Tsebelis 281.1 Judges, Bureaucrats, and the Democratic Deficit 321.2 Veto Players and Their Policy and Institutional Implications 381.3 A Qualified Majority in the Council: To What Extent Does It Impede            Decision Making? 451.4 Battles over the "Default Solution" 541.5 Conclusion 60
Chapter Two: Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European ConventionBy Sven-OliverProksch 622.1 Revealing Preferences: Cosponsorship of Amendments in the European            Convention 642.2 Data and Method 682.3 Results: Giscard's Central Position within the Conflict Space 702.4 Conclusion 75
Chapter Three: The Art of Political Manipulation in the European ConventionBy George Tsebelis and Sven-Oliver Proksch 763.1 Limiting the Number of Amendments 783.2 Shaping Amendments 883.3 The Absence of Voting 943.4 Discussion and Conclusion 95Appendix 3A 97Appendix 3B 99

Chapter Four: Actors and Positions on the Reform of the Treaty of NiceBy Thomas König and Daniel Finke 1034.1 The Process of Reform: From the Convention to the Ratification Stage 1074.2 The Two-dimensional Space and the Location of the Political Leaders' Positions 1114.3 Other Actors and the Cohesiveness of the Political Leaders' Positions 1164.4 Representing and Delegating the Position of Political Leaders 1204.5 The Ratifiers: Median Voters and Political Parties 1254.6 Summary 127

Chapter Five: Why (Unpopular) Leaders Announce Popular VotesBy Thomas König and Daniel Finke 1295.1 Political Leaders and Their Announcements of Referendums 1325.2 Ratification Hurdles in Each Country 1345.3 Decisions along the Ratification Path: A Strategic Consideration 1375.4 The Empirical Analysis of Referendum Announcements 1425.5 From Announcing Referendums to a Reflection Period and Reform Crisis 147

Chapter Six: Principals and Agents: From the Convention's Proposal to the Constitutional TreatyBy Thomas König and Daniel Finke 1516.1 The Setup for Intergovernmental Bargaining 1546.2 The Reaction to Failure: Delegating the Negotiation Mandate 1586.3 How Drifting Agents Enabled a Disagreeable Compromise 1606.4 From Compromising Agents to the Defeat by the Vote of the Irish 166

Chapter Seven: In the Aftermath of the Negative Referendums: The Irish ResistanceBy Thomas König and Daniel Finke 1707.1 The Strategy of the German Presidency 1737.2 Moderate but Well-directed Concessions 1777.3 From Treaty Reform to Constitution Building, and Back 184Conclusion 188

Appendix: Research Design and MethodologyBy Thomas König and Sven-Oliver Proksch 199

References 209

Index 221