In recent years, most political theorists have agreed that shame shouldn't play any role in democratic politics because it threatens the mutual respect necessary for participation and deliberation. But Christina Tarnopolsky argues that not every kind of shame hurts democracy. In fact, she makes a powerful case that there is a form of shame essential to any critical, moderate, and self-reflexive democratic practice. Through a careful study of Plato's Gorgias, Tarnopolsky shows that contemporary conceptions of shame are far too narrow. For Plato, three kinds of shame and shaming practices were possible in democracies, and only one of these is similar to the form condemned by contemporary thinkers. Following Plato, Tarnopolsky develops an account of a different kind of shame, which she calls "respectful shame." This practice involves the painful but beneficial shaming of one's fellow citizens as part of the ongoing process of collective deliberation. And, as Tarnopolsky argues, this type of shame is just as important to contemporary democracy as it was to its ancient form. Tarnopolsky also challenges the view that the Gorgias inaugurates the problematic oppositions between emotion and reason, and rhetoric and philosophy. Instead, she shows that, for Plato, rationality and emotion belong together, and she argues that political science and democratic theory are impoverished when they relegate the study of emotions such as shame to other disciplines.

List of Tables ixAcknowledgments xi


Introduction 1
Contemporary Attitudes toward Shame 1
The Theoretical Debates Surrounding Shame 2
Plato's Relevance to the Contemporary Politics of Shame 6
Plato's Gorgias and the Politics of Shame 16
Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants 21


PART ONE: Plato's Gorgias and the Athenian Politics of Shame 27


CHAPTER ONE: Shame and Rhetoric in Plato's Gorgias 29
Situating Plato's Gorgias within the Platonic Corpus 35
The Dual Character of the Socratic Elenchus 38
From Gorgianic Rhetoric to Platonic Rhetoric 41


CHAPTER TWO: Shaming Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles 56
The Refutation of Gorgias 61
The Refutation of Polus 65
The Refutation of Callicles 79
The Mechanisms of Shame 84


CHAPTER THREE: Plato on Shame in Democratic Athens 89
The Canonical View of Plato's Criticisms of Athens 90
Disrupting the Canon 91
Parrhe¯sia as an Athenian Democratic Ideal 96
Parrhe¯sia and Shame 98
The Structure of Shame 100
Flattering vs. Respectful Shame 104
Plato contra Tyrannical Democrats 110


CHAPTER FOUR: Socratic vs. Platonic Shame 114
Shame and Deception in Plato's Gorgias 114
The Myth as an Illustration of the Socratic Elenchus 120
Platonic Myth vs. Socratic Elenchus 126
Gregory Vlastos on Socratic and Platonic Irony 131
Alexander Nehamas on Socratic and Platonic Irony 133
Socratic vs. Platonic Irony in Plato's Gorgias 136


PART TWO: Plato's Gorgias and the Contemporary Politics of Shame 141


CHAPTER FIVE: Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato and the Contemporary
Politics of Shame and Civility 143
The Contemporary Politics of Shame and Civility 143
Michael Warner and the Politics of Shame 145
Jean Bethke Elshtain and the Politics of Civility 147
Elshtain and Warner: Finding a Common Ground 150
The Conceptual Confusions Surrounding Shame 151
Solving the Conceptual Confusions 153
Socratic Respectful vs. Flattering Shame 160
Platonic Respectful Shame and the Search for Consensus 167


CHAPTER SIX: What's So Negative about the "Negative" Emotions? 172
Defining the "Negative" Emotions 172
Rationality and the Emotions 178
Primitive vs. Advanced Emotions 183
The Positivity of Negativity 193


Bibliography 197
Index 211