The analysis of how institutions are formed, how they operate and change, and how they influence behavior in society has become a major subject of inquiry in politics, sociology, and economics. A leader in applying game theory to the understanding of institutional analysis, Elinor Ostrom provides in this book a coherent method for undertaking the analysis of diverse economic, political, and social institutions.Understanding Institutional Diversity explains the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which enables a scholar to choose the most relevant level of interaction for a particular question. This framework examines the arena within which interactions occur, the rules employed by participants to order relationships, the attributes of a biophysical world that structures and is structured by interactions, and the attributes of a community in which a particular arena is placed.The book explains and illustrates how to use the IAD in the context of both field and experimental studies. Concentrating primarily on the rules aspect of the IAD framework, it provides empirical evidence about the diversity of rules, the calculation process used by participants in changing rules, and the design principles that characterize robust, self-organized resource governance institutions.

List of Illustrations xiAcknowledgments xiii PART I: AN OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT (IAD)FRAMEWORK 1
Chapter One: Understanding the Diversity of Structured Human Interactions 3Diversity: A Core Problem in Understanding Institutions 4Is There an Underlying Set of Universal Building Blocks? 5Holons: Nested Part-Whole Units of Analysis 11Action Arenas as Focal Units of Analysis 13Zooming Out to an Overview of the IAD Framework 15Viewing Action Arenas as Dependent Variables 16Institutional Frameworks, Theories, and Models 27The Limited Frame of This Book 29
Chapter Two: Zooming In and Linking Action Situations 32An Action Situation as a Focal Unit of Analysis 32Example of a Simple Action Situation 35The Basic Working Parts of Action Situations 37Linking Action Arenas 55Predicting Outcomes 64Evaluating Outcomes 66
Chapter Three: Studying Action Situations in the Lab 69The Trust Game in the Experimental Laboratory 70A Commons Dilemma in the Experimental Laboratory 78Structural Changes in the Laboratory 85Replications and Extensions of Commons Dilemma Experiments 93Conclusions 97
Chapter Four: Animating Institutional Analysis 99Animating Open, Competitive Processes 100The Challenge of Imperfect Information 101Assumptions Used in Animating Participants 103Variety and Complexity: An Asset or a Liability? 116A Focus on Collective Action to Overcome Social Dilemmas 119Norms Fostering Collective Action 121Emergence and Survival of Norms in Evolutionary Processes 125Conclusion 131
PART II: FOCUSING ON RULES 135
Chapter Five: A Grammar of Institutions, Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom 137Parsing Institutional Statements 137The Syntax of a Grammar of Institutions 139The Syntax Components 140Applying the Grammar 152Using the Grammar in Empirical Field Research 171Some Next Steps 173
Chapter Six: Why Classify Generic Rules? 175Solving Babbling Equilibrium Problems 176The Policy Analyst 's Need to Understand How to Reform Situations 180Moving beyond Slogan Words to Describe Institutions 181Coping with the Immense Diversity by Identifying Generic Rules 181The Role of Rules as Information Transformation Mechanisms 184An Underlying Universality? 185
Chapter Seven: Classifying Rules, Elinor Ostrom and Sue Crawford 186The Horizontal Approach: Classifying by the A I M of a Rule 187Position Rules 193Boundary Rules 194Choice Rules 200Aggregation Rules 202Information Rules 206Payoff Rules 207Scope Rules 208Default Conditions: What Happens if No Rules Exist Related to Components of an Action Situation? 210The Vertical Approach: Operational, Collective-Choice, and Constitutional-Choice Levels of Analysis 214Using Rules as Tools to Change Outcomes 215
PART III: WORKING WITH RULES 217
Chapter Eight: Using Rules as Tools to Cope with the Commons 219Field Research on Common-Pool Resources 221What Rules Are Found in Self-Organized Common-Pool Resource Regimes? 222Contemporary Approaches to Resource Policy 236Coping with Complexity: A General Problem 242Changing Rules as an Adaptive Process 243Theoretical Puzzles 251Summing Up 253
Chapter Nine: Robust Resource Governance in Polycentric Institutions 255Design Principles and Robust Social-Ecological Systems 258Threats to Robust Governance of Common-Pool Resources 271Modest Coping Methods for Dealing with Threats to Sustainability 279The Advantage and Limits of Polycentric Systems in Coping with Design and Long-Term Sustainability of Systems 281The Capabilities of Polycentric Systems in Coping with Tragedies of the Commons 283Conclusion 287
Notes 289References 307Index 351