As France begins to confront the new challenges of the post-Cold War era, the time has come to examine how French security policy has evolved since Charles de Gaulle set it on an independent course in the 1960s. Philip Gordon shows that the Gaullist model, contrary to widely held beliefs, has lived on--but that its inherent inconsistencies have grown more acute with increasing European unification, the diminishing American military role in Europe, and related strains on French military budgets. The question today is whether the Gaullist legacy will enable a strong and confident France to play a full role in Europe's new security arrangements or whether France, because of its will to independence, is destined to play an isolated, national role.Gordon analyzes military doctrines, strategies, and budgets from the 1960s to the 1990s, and also the evolution of French policy from the early debates about NATO and the European Community to the Persian Gulf War. He reveals how and why Gaullist ideas have for so long influenced French security policy and examines possible new directions for France in an increasingly united but potentially unstable Europe.

List of Tables
Preface

Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

Pt. 1 The Gaullist Years 1

Ch. 1 Perspectives on de Gaulle 3

Why Start with de Gaulle? 3

De Gaulle and Change: The Provisory and the Permanent 6

De Gaulle and the Nation-State in Europe 9

De Gaulle's "Idea of France" 14

Independence and Grandeur as Goals and Means 17

Gaullist Ideas and Gaullist Policies 21

Ch. 2 The Missing Pillar: France's Role in the Defense of Europe in the 1950s and 1960s 23

The Missing Pillar during the Fourth Republic 24

The Missing Pillar during the Gaullist Years 29

Explaining the "Missing Pillar" under de Gaulle 31

France's Nuclear Force and Europe 39

The International Context and the French Contribution 46

Ch. 3 Manipulating Ambiguity: Military Doctrines under de Gaulle and Pompidou 53

Conventional Doctrine through the Mid-1960s 53

Early Nuclear Doctrines 57

The Direct Legacy: The Fourquet Doctrine 64

Pompidou's Initial Challenge 68

Codified Ambiguity: The White Paper on National Defense 70

French Military Doctrine in Retrospect 77

Pt. 2 Struggling to Adapt 79

Ch. 4 Giscard's Balancing Act, 1974-1981 81

The "Post-Gaullist" Period 81

Revising France's Military Doctrines 83

Reorganizing the Army, 1975-1977 89

Nuclear Cooperation with the United States 92

Opposition to Change and Its Lessons 93

Defense Policy and the Economic Constraint 100

Conclusions on the Giscardian Experience 104

Ch. 5 Mitterrand's Adaptations, 1981-1986 106

The Socialists' Turnaround and Its Explanations 106

Security Policy under the Socialists: Adapting to de Gaulle 112

Mitterrand's Atlantic Rapprochement: Adapting to NATO 118

The German Role: Adapting to Europe 124

Defense Policy and the Economic Constraint Revisited 134

The Socialists in Retrospect 138

Ch. 6 Tensions in the Consensus, 1986-1989 139

A Changing Military Context and Its Impact on France 140

Cohabitation and the French Defense Debate 144

The Debates of Cohabitation 146

Cohabitation in Retrospect 156

Putting off the Choices: May 1988-May 1989 158

Pt. 3 France in the New Europe 161

Ch. 7 The Gaullist Legacy Today: French Security Policy in the 1990s 163

A Look Back: Continuity Since de Gaulle 163

France and NATO in the 1990s 165

France and the European Security Identity 172

The Lessons of the Persian Gulf War: The View from Paris 178

Conclusions: Continuities amid Change 183

Ch. 8 Epilogue: The Gaullist Legacy and the Post-Cold War World 186

De Gaulle's Post-Cold War World 186

Gaullist Military Logic and the New Europe 191

Reconciling de Gaulle with Europe 197

Notes 203

Glossary of French Terms Used 235

Selected Bibliography 237

Index 251