The purpose of this book is to formulate and discuss positive (as distinguished from normative) rational choice models of the advantages and costs of transparency in various areas of public sector activity and to assess what is in effect the social level of obfuscation in politics that results from rational behaviour.

Contents: Introduction, Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe. Part 1 In Democratic Contexts: Acquiescence to opacity, Pierre Salmon and Alain Wolfelsperger; Citizens' Knowledge, Politicians' Duplicity, Russell Hardin; Transparency and efficiency, Albert Breton. Part 2 In International Settings: The Artist as a Secret Agent: Liberalism Against Populism, Manfred J. Holler; Jihad vs. McWorld: A Rational Choice Approach, Ronald Wintrobe. Part 3 Corruption: Invisible Feet and Grabbing Hands: the Political Economy of Corruption and Welfare, Johann Lambsdorff; Information, Corruption, and Measures for the Promotion of Manufactured Exports, Glenn P. Jenkins and Chun-Yan Kuo. Part 4 Government Behavior: Cases for and Against Transparency/Obfuscation in Intergovernmental Relations, Giorgio Brosio; Transparency in the Budget Process of a Bureaucratic Organization: A Principal-Agent Model of Budgeting, Louis M. Imbeau; Redistribution, Decentralization, and Constitutional Rules, Federico Etro and Piero Giarda. Index.