This book features a lively debate between two prominent scholars¿Michael A. Genovese and David Gray Adler¿on the critical issue of whether the Constitution, written in the 18th Century, remains adequate to the national security challenges of our time. The question of the scope of the president¿s constitutional authority¿if any¿to initiate war on behalf of the American people, long the subject of heated debate in the corridors of power and the groves of academe, has become an issue of surpassing importance for a nation confronted by existential threats in an Age of Terrorism. This question should be thoroughly reviewed and debated by members of Congress, and considered by all Americans before they are asked to go to war. If the constitutional allocation of powers on matters of war and peace is outdated, what changes should be made? Is there a need to increase presidential power? What role should Congress play in the war on terror?

Spotlights the post-9/11 foreign policy environment and the evolving executive branch's increased ability to act independently from Congress to address terrorist threats

Preface/AcknowledgmentsChapter  I   War and American DemocracyMichael A. GenoveseIntroductionThe PredicateThe ProblemTaming the American PrinceInventing a PresidencyDefending the ConstitutionThe Ratification DebatesThe Rise of Presidential PowerEarly Practice: The War Powers in Action9/11: Everything ChangedInter Arma Evin Silent, or, Full Circle and the Return of the KingRevolution in PolicyThings ChangeThe Presidency, Foreign Policy, and WarThe Power of ContextChapter  II Prescriptions for a New Age What to Do?Constitutional ChangeOld Wine in New Bottles Just Won't Do:  Rethinking the War Powers in an Age of TerrorismPolitical ChangesPresidential Power in a Dangerous AgeIs the Presidency Safe for Democracy?Chapter III The Relevance of the War ClauseDavid Gray AdlerThe War Clause and the Rule of Law                                                                            80  Constitutional Arrangement for War Remains Adequate                                              87 Background on the Constitution and National Security                                                 93  The Claim: Plenary Executive Power in Foreign Affairs                                               98 The Claim: Unilateral Presidential Power to Use Force                                               101The War Clause and Commander in Chief in Context                                                  102  The Claim: The Commander in Chief May Initiate War                                               116 The Claim: The Vesting Clause Confers Presidential War Power                                120 The Claim: Presidential Prerogative and War Making                                                  122  The Claim: The War Clause is Obsolete                                                                       123  The Claim: Presidential Information Justifies War Making                                          131 Chapter IV. Prescriptions for Protecting Constitutional Design for War                      134Conclusions                                                                                                             137Index                                                                                                                        140