Economists generally accept that competition discloses knowledge, enhances efficiency and restrains power. However, these effects of competition have so far been discussed mainly with respect to economic markets in which firms and households compete within a given set of institutions, that is within a given legal order. The question arises whether competition may also have comparable effects on the institutional level in the sense of competition among legal orders and thus serve as an antidote to today's problems. The present book addresses some of the fundamental aspects associated with institutional competition and identifies some possible lines for further research on how institutions can compete to bring about social and economic change.

Introduction - Acknowledgements - Notes on the Contributors - Institutional Competition; L.Gerken - PART ONE - Evolution within Constraints; W.Kerber & V.Vanberg - Causes for Changes of Political Economic Regimes; P.Bernholz - Legal Experiences with Competition among Institutions; C.Engel - International Migration and Institutional Competition: An Application of Hayek's Evolutionary Theory; P.Welter - Competition among Legal Institutions: Implications for the Evolution of Law; B.L.Benson - Competitions of Socio-economic Institutions: in Search of Winners; P.Pelikan - PART TWO - Competition among Jurisdictions: The Idea of Focj; B.S.Frey & R.Eichenberger - The European Market for Protectionism: New Competitors and New Products; A.Freytag - Liberty, Competition and the Rise of Coercion in American Federalism; J.Kincaid - Standardization: The Evolution of Institutions versus Government Intervention; G.Knieps - Transformation of the Economic System in the Russian Federation: What Role for Competition among Regional Governments?; M.Lucke - Index