Beschreibung:
Propositions have been used to explain cognitive thought, language, communication, and philosophical concepts of truth, necessity and possibility. Based on the theories of Frege and Russell, propositions are structured abstract objects, independent of mind and language, possessing essential and intrinsic truth-conditions. Recent theorizing doubts the existence of propositions and our ability to grasp, entertain, and know them, but most importantly, whether the abstract approach can explain propositions. The papers in this volume use these doubts to explore new critical and constructive directions. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
1. Introduction Part I: On Act- and Language-Based Conceptions of Propositions 2. Two aspects of propositional unity 3. An empirically-informed cognitive theory of propositions 4. What are the primary bearers of truth? 5. Not the optimistic type 6. Why it isn't syntax that unifies the proposition 7. Why we should not identify sentence structure with propositional structure Part II: Constituents and Constituency 8. Individuating Fregean sense 9. The metaphysics of propositional constituency Part III: Theoretical Alternatives to Propositions 10. Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products 11. What are Propositions? 12. Conversational implicature, communicative intentions, and content 13. Propositions and higher-order attitude attributions Part IV: Modal Metaphysics 14. Unnecessary existents 15. Contingently existing propositions