This book examines the ways in which long-term processes of state-formation limit the possibilities for short-term political projects of statebuilding.

Introduction: Statebuilding and State-Formation Part I: State-Formation, Violence and Political Economy 1. Risk and Externalisation in Afghanistan - Why Statebuilding Upends State-Formation 2. International Intervention and the Congolese Army: A Paradox of Intermediary Rule 3. War Makers and State Makers: On State-Formative Networks and Illiberal Political Economy in Kosovo 4. Georgia-South Ossetia Networks of Profit: Challenges to Statebuilding Part II: Governance, Legitimacy and Practice in Statebuilding and State-Formation 5. Statebuilding versus State-Formation in East Timor 6. The Limitations of International Analyses of the State and Post-Conflict Statebuilding in Sierra Leone 7. Statebuilding as Tacit Trusteeship: The Case of Liberia 8. The Road Less Travelled: Self-Led Statebuilding and International 'Non-Intervention' in the Creation of Somaliland Part III: The International Self- Statebuilders' Institutional Logics, Social Backgrounds and Subjectivities 9. Three Arenas: The Conflictive Logic of External Statebuilding 10. The International Scramble for Police Reform in the Balkans 11. The 'Statebuilding Habitus': UN Staff and the Cultural Dimension of Liberal Intervention in Kosovo 12. The International Self and the Humanitarianisation of Politics: A Case Study of Goma, DR Congo 13. The State We Are(n't) In: Liminal Subjectivity in Aid Worker Auto-Biographies Conclusions: Neither Built nor Formed - the Transformation of States under International Intervention