The essays here address the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict, the political economy of economic sanctions, and the role of economic incentives in international statecraft.

The political economy of national security - economic statecraft, interdependence and international conflict, Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield and Norrin M. Ripsman; trade expectations and the outbreak of peace - detente 1970-74 and the end of the Cold War 1985-91, Dale C. Copeland; the offense-defense balance, interdependence and war, Peter Liberman; preferential trading arrangement and military disputes, Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse and David J. Bearce; strategy, economic relations and the definition of national interests, Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner; sleeping with the (potential) enemy - assessing the US policy of engagement with China, Paul A. Papayoanou and Scott L. Kastner; the trouble with carrots - transaction costs, conflict expectations and economic inducements, Daniel W. Drezner; asking the right question - when do economic sanctions work best?, Jean-Marc B. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman; economic sanctions do work - economic statecraft and the oil embargo of Rhodesia, David M. Rowe; economic statecraft, inderdependence and national security - agendas for research, Michael Mastanduno.