The book sets out to show how in the 20th century the British army has learnt lessons from one war in order to prepare for the next. For the British Army in the twentieth century the challenge has been particularly great as it has never had the luxury of emerging from one major European war and then preparing itself for the next but has always has to reckon with ongoing commitments to a range of "small wars" that included after 1902 and again after 1918 colonial campaigns, counter-insurgency operations between 1945 and 1969 and almost predominantly since 1990 peace support operations. As the Army's current doctrine is still that by preparing for major war it also enables itself to prepare for lesser conflicts, this volume explores the historical dimension to this debate and offers analyses by the most prominent experts in the field including Hew Strachan, Edward Spiers, David French, Paul Cornish, Daniel Marston, David Benest, Simon Ball and Colin McInnes. This book will be of great interest to students of military history and strategic studies, in general, and of particular interest to students of the British Army and British military doctrine.

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