Beschreibung:
Most of the philosophical literature on truth concentrates on certain ontological and epistemic problems. This book proposes a novel theory of truth and falsity. It argues that truth is a form of reference and falsity is a form of reference failure.
Part I: The Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity: 1. Introducing the Referential Theory, 2. Frege's Theory of Truth and Falsity, 3. Whenglish: A Language with No Sentences, 4. Slingshot Argument. Part II: Some Common Theories of Truth in Relation to the Referential Theory: 5. Correspondence Theories, 6. Identity Theory, 7. Truthmaker Theories, 8. Deflationism. Part III: Sentences with Logical Operators: 9. Negation, 10. Disjunctions and Conditionals, 11. Existential and General Statements. Part IV: Applications and Implications of the Referential Theory: 12. Liar Paradox, 13. Sentence Reference and User Reference, 14. Ostensible versus Inostensible Reference, 15. Sentences as Rigid and Accidental Designators, 16. Necessity and Contingency, 17. Knowledge and Curiosity, 18. Evolution of Language and Emergence of Truth and Falsity.