In this study, Zach Levey provides a comprehensive analysis of the development of Israel's foreign policy during the critical years of the 1950s, focusing particularly on relations between the Jewish state and the three Western powers involved in the Middle East arms race--the United States, Great Britain, and France. Drawing extensively on recently declassified archival materials, Levey challenges traditional accounts of the nature and success of Israel's policy goals. By 1950 Israel's primary foreign policy objective was the creation of a bilateral strategic relationship with the United States. The country's leaders failed to achieve that goal, though, even after the Suez-Sinai campaigns of 1956. According to Levey, it was this failure that motivated Israel to cultivate ties with the West's other leading powers, France and Britain. But cooperation with these countries was not the outgrowth of a gradually developing strategic understanding with either one, he argues. Instead, Israel viewed its French and British connections only as temporary substitutes for the desired eventual arrangement with the United States.Originally published in 1997.A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.