Beschreibung:
Since 1993, Supreme Court precedent has asked judges to serve as gatekeepers to their expert witnesses, admitting only reliable scientific testimony. Lacking a strong background in science, however, some judges admit dubious scientific testimony packages by articulate practitioners, while others reject reliable evidence that is unreasonably portrayed as full of holes. Seeking a balance between undue deference and undeserved skepticism, Caudill and LaRue draw on the philosophy of science to help judges, juries, and advocates better understand its goals and limitations.
Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 1. What's the Problem? Chapter 3 2. On Judges Who Are Too Strict Chapter 4 3. On Judges Who Are Too Gullible Chapter 5 4. The Idealizations of Legal Scholars Chapter 6 5. Science is a Pragmatic Activity Chapter 7 6. Science Studies for Law