This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable.

List of figures; List of tables; Preface Bo Gustafsson; 1. Post-Walrasian political economy Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; Part I. Agency, Incentives, and Democratic Accountability: 2. The democratic firm: an agency-theoretic evaluation Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; 3. Alternative employment and payment systems D. M. Nuti; Part II. Institutions and Institutional Change: 4. Toward a framework for analyzing institutions and institutional change Leonid Hurwicz; 5. Imperfect choice and rule-governed behaviour Ronald A. Heiner; 6. Organizational equilibria and institutional stability Ugo Pagano; 7. Agency problems and the future of comparative systems' theory Mieke Meurs; Part III. Conditions For the Success of the Democratic Firm: 8. After the employment relation: problems on the road to enterprise democracy Louis Putterman; 9. Unions versus cooperatives Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein; 10. Demand variability and work organization David I. Levine; 11. Democracy versus appropriability: can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world? Gregory K. Dow; Part IV. Productivity, Distribution, and Power: 12. Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations Avner Ben-Ner; 13. Wage bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms Gilbert L. Skillmand and Harl E. Ryder; Part V. Ownership, Participation, and Capital Markets: 14. The motivational role of an external agent in the informationally-participatory firm Masahiko Aoki; 15. Unstable ownership Tone Ogedal; 16. The simple analytics of a membership market in a labor-managed economy Ernst Fehr; Part VI. Political Democracy and Economic Democracy: 17. Investment planning in market socialism Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre; 18. Capitalism and Democracy: a summing up of the arguments Martin L. Weitzman; Bibliography; Author Index; Subject index.