Based on a four year research project investigating voting behavior, Topics In Social Choice begins with the well-known premise that different voting procedures may lead to different outcomes. The author then fills a void in present literature by comparing voting procedures in terms of four issues: sophisticated versus sincere voting; sophisticated voters and simultaneous versus sequential voting; voter efficacy in plurality and approval voting; and the use of normative standards to compare outcomes. He proposes both a new model of sophisticated voting and normative standards for proportional representation procedures. This study addresses both the general reader interested in voting issues and the serious student of voting schemes, voting behavior, and social choice theory.Topics In Social Choice is divided into three parts representing its three themes. It addresses theoretical and experimental aspects of sophisticated voting; the problem of efficacy and correct decision; and it concludes with an investigation of fair proportional representation. The volume represents the first attempt to address sophisticated and yet simultaneous voting. It is also the first to subject various voting models to competitive testing and provide a set of normative criteria for systems evaluation.

The author compares voting procedures in terms of four issues: sophisticated versus sincere voting; sophisticated voters and simultaneous versus sequential voting; voter efficacy in plurality and approval voting; and the use of normative to compare outcomes. He proposes both a new model of sophisticated voting and normative standards for proportional representation procedures.

PrefaceSophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures: Theoretical Models and Experimental EvidenceSophisticated Voting: Orientation and General ApproachTwo Models of Sophisticated Voting: Farquharson and Niemi-FrankThe Social Desirability of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval ProceduresThe Chairman's Paradox and Its Extensions under Sophisticated Plurality and Approval Voting According to Models F and NFThe Condorcet-Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting According to Model F under the Plurality and Approval ProceduresTacit Cooperation in Three-Alternative Noncooperative Voting Games: A New Model of Sophisticated Behavior under the Plurality and Approval ProceduresSincere versus Sophisticated Behavior Under PV and AV: A Competitive Test of Four ModelsEfficacy and "Correct Decisions"Efficacy in Small Electorates under the Plurality and Approval ProceduresIs Cumulative Voting Really Different from Plurality Voting?On Combining Approval with Disapproval VotingMajority Rule, "Correct Decisions," and the Quorum ParadoxProportional Representation: Normative Schemes and an Empirical Evaluation of Voting ProceduresMicrocosms and Macrocosms: Normative Schemes for Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation SystemsProportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of the Plurality and Approval ProceduresAppendix A: Possible Size Relations Among Four BlocsAppendix B: Proof of the Propositions in Chapter 6Appendix C: Detailed Results of Experiments 1 and 2BibliographyAuthor IndexSubject Index