In the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission had embarked on an activist consumer protection and antitrust agenda which resulted in severe public and congressional backlash, including calls to abolish the agency. Beginning in 1981, under the direction of Chairman James Miller, the FTC started down a new path of economically-oriented policymaking. This new approach helped save the FTC and laid the groundwork for it to grow into the world-class consumer protection and antitrust agency that it is today.The Regulatory Revolution at the FTC examines this period of transition in light of continuing debate about the FTC's mission. Editor James Campbell Cooper has assembled contributions from leading economists and scholars, including many of the central figures in the Miller-era Commission and today's FTC, who provide a comprehensive and revealing story about the importance of economic analysis in regulatory decision-making. Together, they foster a crucial understanding of the evolution of the FTC from an agency on the brink of extinction to one widely respected for its performance and economic sophistication.

Foreword: James C. CooperINTRODUCTION:PLANTING THE SEEDS OF THE REGULATORY REVOLUTIONChapter 1: James C. MillerCauses and Implications of the Regulatory Revolution at the FTCChapter 2: Panel DiscussionPolitics and Policy in 1981PART I:JURISDICTION, POLICY, AND PROCEDUREChapter 3: William E. KovacicThe Federal Trade Commission and the Assignment of Regulatory TasksChapter 4: Julie BrillThe Future of FTC Jurisdiction Over Antitrust and Consumer Protection: A CommentaryChapter 5: Joshua D. Wright & Angela DiveleyDo Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade CommissionChapter 6: A. Douglas MelamedParadigm Shopping: Section 5, the FTC, and the CourtsPART II:CONSUMER PROTECTIONChapter 7: Fred S. McChesneyConsumer Protection and James Miller at the Federal Trade CommissionChapter 8: J. Howard Beales, III, Timothy J. Muris & Robert PitofskyIn Defense of the Pfizer FactorsChapter 9: Paul H. Rubin & Thomas M. LenardThe FTC Then and Now: PrivacyChapter 10: Paul A. PautlerRegulation and Behavioral Economics in the Post-Miller FTCPART III:ANTITRUSTChapter 11: Richard S. Higgins & Mark PerelmanTying to Mitigate the Deadweight Loss of Monopoly PricingChapter 12: Daniel A. CraneSection 5 and the Innovation CurveCONCLUSION:IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE FTC ENFORCEMENTChapter 13: Panel DiscussionLessons for Setting PrioritiesIndex