Since the late 1970's, the main research program for understanding intentionality -- the mind's ability to direct itself onto the world -- has been based on the attempt naturalize intentionality, in the sense of making it intelligible how intentionality can occur in a perfectly natural, indeed entirely physical, world. Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness - - the subjective feel of conscious experience -- has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role missing in the naturalization program. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complementary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research program.With twelve new essays by philosophers at the forefront of the field, this volume is designed to launch this research program in a more self-conscious way, by exploring some of the fundamental claims and themes of relevance to this program.

Chapter 1: The Phenomenal Intentionality Research ProgramUriah KriegelChapter 2: The Access ProblemMichelle MontagueChapter 3: Indexical ThoughtDavid PittChapter 4: Phenomenal PresenceChristopher FreyChapter 5: Consciousness and SynthesisColin McGinnChapter 6: Constructing a World for the SensesKatalin FarkasChapter 7: Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian AccountFarid MasrourChapter 8: Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional ObjectsFrederick KroonChapter 9: Unconscious Belief and Conscious ThoughtTim CraneChapter 10: Intellectual GestaltsElijah ChudnoffChapter 11: Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam PautzChapter 12: Phenomenality and Self-ConsciousnessCharles Siewert