The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution is a volume of original essays that discuss the applicability of Hart's rule of recognition model of a legal system to U.S. constitutional law. The contributors are leading scholars in analytical jurisprudence and constitutional theory, including Matthew Adler, Larry Alexander, Mitchell Berman, Michael Dorf, Kent Greenawalt, Richard Fallon, Michael Green, Kenneth Einar Himma, Stephen Perry, Frederick Schauer, Scott Shapiro, Jeremy Waldron, and Wil Waluchow. The volume makes a contribution both in jurisprudence, using the U.S. as a "test case" that highlights the strengths and limitations of the rule of recognition model; and in constitutional theory, by showing how the model can illuminate topics such as the role of the Supreme Court, the constitutional status of precedent, the legitimacy of unwritten sources of constitutional law, the choice of methods for interpreting the text of the Constitution, and popular constitutionalism.

IntroductionMatthew D. Adler and Kenneth Einar HimmaChapter 1: The Rule of Recognition and the ConstitutionKent GreenawaltChapter 2: Precedent-Based Constitutional Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of RecognitionRichard H. Fallon, Jr.Chapter 3: How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extra-Constitutional Rule of RecognitionMichael C. DorfChapter 4: Understanding the Relationship between the U.S. Constitution and the Conventional Rule of RecognitionKenneth Einar HimmaChapter 5: Four Concepts of Validity: Reflections on Inclusive and Exclusive PositivismWil WaluchowChapter 6: How to Understand the Rule of Recognition and the American ConstitutionKent GreenawaltChapter 7: Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on AcceptanceLarry Alexander and Frederick SchauerChapter 8: Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Rule of RecognitionMatthew D. AdlerChapter 9: What is the Rule of Recognition (And Does It Exist)?Scott J. ShapiroChapter 10: Constitutional Theory and the Rule of Recognition: Toward a Fourth Theory of LawMitchell N. BermanChapter 11: Where All Have the Powers Gone: Hartian Rules of Recognition, Noncognitivsm, and the Constitutional and Jurisprudential Foundations of LawStephen PerryChapter 12: Who Needs Rules of Recognition?Jeremy WaldronChapter 13: Kelsen, Quietism, and the Rule of RecognitionMichael Steven Green