A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism, where moral (and other normative) judgments are understood as representational or belief-like states, and pure non-cognitivism, where they are understood as non-representational or desire-like states. Rather, philosophers have adopted views which seek in some way to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. This collection of twelve new essays examines the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language. The papers, which focus mainly on moral thought and talk, provide a guide to this debate while also pushing it forward along numerous fronts.

ContributorsIntroductionPart I1. How to Insult a PhilosopherMichael Ridge2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional SemanticsDaniel Boisvert3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open Questions and Moral MotivationDavid Copp4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language: Noncognitive Type-GeneralityRyan Hay5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral RealismJon Tresan6. The Pragmatics of Normative DisagreementStephen Finlay7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning.John ErikssonPart II8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and ImplicatureGuy Fletcher9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional ImplicatureStephen Barker10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View?Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of Normative JudgmentLaura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter12. Truth In Hybrid SemanticsMark SchroederBibliographyIndex