The Epistemology of Disagreement brings together essays from a dozen philosophers on the epistemic significance of disagreement; all but one of the essays are new. Questions discussed include: When (if ever) does the disagreement of others require a rational agent to revise her beliefs? Do 'conciliatory' accounts, on which agents are required to revise significantly, suffer from fatal problems of self-defeat, given the disagreement about disagreement? Whatis the significance of disagreement about philosophical topics in particular? How does the epistemology of disagreement relate to broader epistemic theorizing? Does the increased significance of multiple disagreeing agents depend on their being independent of one another? John Hawthorne and Amia SrinivasanThomas Kelly, and Brian Weatherson all weigh in with attacks on conciliatory views or defenses of non-conciliatory approaches. David Christensen and Stewart Cohen take up the opposite side of the debate. Bryan Frances, Sanford Goldberg, and Ernest Sosa discuss a kind of disagreement that will be of particular concern to most readers of this book: disagreement about philosophy. And Robert Audi, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Jennifer Lackey tackle some general theoretical issues that bear on disagreement.The philosophers represented here include some who have contributed actively to the disagreement literature already, as well as some who are exploring the issue for the first time. Their work helps to deepen and expand our understanding of some epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful believer's engagement with other believers.

List of Contributors; David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey: Introduction; Part One: The Debate between Conciliatory and Steadfast Theorists; A. For Steadfastness; 1 John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan: Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts; 2 Thomas Kelly: Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment; 3 Brian Weatherson: Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise; B. For Conciliation; 4 David Christensen: Epistemic Modesty Defended; 5 Stewart Cohen: A Tentative Defense of the Equal Weight View; Part Two: Disagreement in Philosophy; 6 Bryan Frances: Philosophical Renegades; 7 Sanford Goldberg: Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion; 8 Ernest Sosa: Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It Be Founded on Intuitions?; Part Three: New Concepts and New Problems in the Epistemology of Disagreement; 9 Robert Audi: Cognitive Disparities: Dimensions of Intellectual Diversity and the Resolution of Disagreements; 10 Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent; 11 Jennifer Lackey: Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter; Index