This volume brings together new work by leading philosophers on the topics of emotion and value, and explores issues at their intersection. Philosophers and psychologists working on the emotions have reached something of a consensus about the complex, inter-related nature of the affective and cognitive components of emotions, and have increasingly focussed on the important epistemological role that emotions play in giving us access to values. At the same time, anincreasing number of philosophers have become attracted to analyses of value that give emotions a prominent place in evaluative judgements and experiences. The work undertaken in each of these areas has important implications for current research on topics such as the role that emotions play inpractical rationality and moral psychology, the connection between imagination and emotion in the appreciation of fiction, and more generally with the ability of emotions to discern axiological saliences and to ground (or fail to ground) the objectivity of ethical or aesthetic value judgements. This volume makes a unique contribution to scholarship on emotion and value by bringing together top authors from these lines of research. In addition, the volume contains a number of contributions thatexplore various links between the emotions and self-understanding, touching on a range of themes that include depression, empathy, agency, guilt, and self-trust. All of these issues are approached from a number of different perspectives in order to present the reader with a wide view of thisextremely rich terrain and to demonstrate how the latest thinking in a number of currently intensive areas of research is deeply interconnected.

1 Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd: Emotion and Value: Introduction; Part I. Emotion and the Nature of Value; 2 Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni: In what Sense are Emotions Evaluations?; 3 Michelle Montague: Evaluative Phenomenology; 4 Michael Brady: Emotion, Attention, and the Nature of Value; 5 Jonathan Dancy: Emotions as Unitary States; 6 Cain Todd: Relatively Fitting Emotions and Apparently Objective Values; Part II. Emotion, Evaluation, and Justification; 7 Adam Pelser: Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification; 8 Sabine Doring: Why Recalcitrant Emotions Are Not Irrational; 9 Adam Morton: Surprise; 10 Greg Currie: Emotions Fit for Fictions; Part III. Emotion, Value and the Self; 11 Linda Zagzebski: Emotional Self-trust; 12 Nancy Sherman: Self-empathy and Moral Repair; 13 Michael Lacewing: Emotions and the Virtues of Self-understanding; 14 Jan Slaby and Philipp Wuschner: Emotion and Agency; 15 Matthew Ratcliffe: Evaluating Existential Despair