The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved.Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This second volume examines constitutional political economy and also various applications, including public policy, international relations, and the study of history, as well as methodological and measurement issues.Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.

PART V: Constitutional Political EconomyA. On the Architecture of Governance1. How Should Votes be Cast and Counted?Nicolaus Tideman2. Voters and representatives: How should representatives be selected?Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer3. Divided Government: the king and the councilGeorge Tridimas4. BicameralismCecilia Testa5. FederalismJaroslaw Kantorowicz6. Executive Veto Power and Constitutional DesignNicholas R. Miller7. Politics and the Legal SystemLee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal8. Constitutional ReviewNuno Garoupa9. Institutions for Amending ConstitutionsCristina Bucur and Bj?rn Erik Rasch10. Constitutional TransitionZachary Elkins11. Electoral systems in the makingDaniel Bochsler12. Choosing Voting Rules in the European UnionB?la Plechanovov?, Madeleine O. Hosli and Anatolij PlechanovB. The Theory of Dictatorship13. Leviathan, Taxation, and Public GoodsMartin C. McGuire14. Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model after 40 YearsGeoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt15. Are There Types of Dictatorship?Ronald Wintrobe16. Are there really dictatorships? The Selectorate and authoritarian governanceAlejandro Quiroz Flores17. The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimesToke Aidt and Gabriel Leon18. The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice PerspectivesTimur Kuran and Diego RomeroC. On the Effects of the Institutions of Governance19. Direct Democracy and Public PolicyJohn G. Matsusaka20. Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systemsSebastian M. Saiegh21. The Significance of Political PartiesMichael Munger22. The least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governanceGeorg Vanberg23. Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public PolicyStefan Voigt and Jerg GutmannPART VI: APPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUESA. The Politics of Public Policy24. The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, RedistributionStanley L. Winer25. The politics of central bank independenceJakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger26. The Political Economy of Redistribution PolicyLuna Bellani and Heinrich Ursprung27. Political Participation and the welfareRainald Borck28. Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional DesignPaul Dragos Aligica and Michael E. Cox29. Rational Ignorance and Public ChoiceIlya Somin30. Is Government Growth Inevitable?Randall G. HolcombeB. International Public Choice31. The Political Economy of International OrganizationsAxel Dreher and Valentin F. Lang32. The Politics of International TradeWilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman33. Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets and the Shadow Economy: What do we (not) know?Friedrich Schneider34. The Politics of International AidHristos Doucouliagos35. Is democracy exportable?Pierre SalmonC. Public Choice and History36. Ancient Greece: Democracy and AutocracyRobert K. Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen37. Christian History and Public ChoiceMario Ferrero38. Voting at the U.S. Constitutional ConventionKeith L. Dougherty39. Precursors to public choiceIain McLeanD. Measurement and other Methodological Issues40. Estimates of the Spatial Voting ModelChristopher Hare and Keith T. Poole41. The Dimensionality of Parliamentary VotingKeith T. Poole42. Voting and PopularityGebhard Kirchg?ssner43. Detection of election fraudSusumu Shikano and Verena Mack44. Experimental Public Choice: ElectionsAaron Kamm and Arthur Schram45. Experimental Evidence on Expressive VotingJean-Robert Tyran and Alexander K. Wagner