The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved.Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics.Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.

PART I: Introductory Essays1. Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public ChoiceRoger D. Congleton2. Choosing among GovernmentsAlan Hamlin3. Public Choice: Early ContributionsDennis C. MuellerPART II: VOTING AND ELECTIONSA. Modelling Collective Choice in Voting4. From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow's TheoremDonald G. Saari5. Institution-induced StabilityKenneth A. Shepsle6. Voting PowerStefan Napel7. Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting RulesShmuel Nitzan and Jacob ParoushB. Spatial Voting Models8. Political Choices in One Dimension: TheoryBernard Grofman9. Political Choices in One Dimension: ApplicationsBernard Grofman10. Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two DimensionsJames F. Adams11. Spatial Social ChoiceNorman SchofieldC. Other Aspects of Voter and Party Choice12. Economic VotingMichael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier13. Valence PoliticsHaldun Evrenk14. The Study of Strategic VotingAndr? Blais and Arianna Degan15. Turnout: Why do voters vote?Serguei Kaniovski16. Expressive VotingAlan Hamlin and Colin Jennings17. Altruism and Political ParticipationRichard Jankowski18. Social Embeddedness and Rational TurnoutCarole Jean Uhlaner19. Information cues and rational ignoranceShaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson20. ManipulationCharles R. PlottD. Democracy in Practice21. Campaign FinanceThomas Stratmann22. Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: How do they matter?Gilles Serra23. Logrolling and CoalitionsAnthony J. McGannPART III: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND RENT SEEKINGA. Interest Group Politics24. Collective ActionJac C. Heckelman25. Rent seeking: The social cost of contestable benefitsArye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long26. The Structure of Contests and the Extent of DissipationKarl W?rneryd27. The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent ExtractionRoger D. Congleton28. Empirical evidence on rent seeking costsIgnacio Del RosalB. Political Agency Problems and Trust in Government29. 'The Bureaucracy' as an Interest GroupPatrick Dunleavy30. Interest Groups and Regulatory CaptureWilliam F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas31. CorruptionToke Aidt32. The Political Economy of TrustChristian Bj?rnskovC. Persuasion33. Contested Political PersuasionStergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya34. Stochastic Process Models of Preference ChangeMichel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu35. Leadership as PersuasionBenjamin E. HermalinPART IV: NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY: EVALUATING POLICIES AND POLITIES36. Fairness ConceptsChristian Klamler37. Social Contract vs. Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social DilemmasViktor J. Vanberg38. Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State ActionNicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann39. Public Choice and HappinessBruno Frey and Alois Stutzer40. Kantianism and Political InstitutionsGeoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt41. Public choice and libertarianismPeter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano42. Public choice and social democracyPeter Kurrild-Klitgaard43. Supreme Values, Totalitarianism and TerrorismPeter Bernholz44. Fair Division in Dispute ResolutionSteven J. Brams45. Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet MinistriesSteven J. Brams