If quantum theories of the world are true-and empirical evidence suggests they are-what do they tell us about us, and the world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of material objects? Nearly a century after the development of quantum theories, a consensus has yet to emerge. Many still wonder about what these theories may be telling us about ourselves and our place in the universe.Alyssa Ney here defends and develops a particular framework for understanding the world as it is described by quantum theories. This framework was initially suggested by Schr?dinger in the 1920's and was further defended as an account of reality by two philosophers of physics in the 1990's who described it as a necessary point of view for those who argue that quantum theories are correct representations of our world. This framework is called wave function realism, which interprets quantum theories such that its central object is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field on an extremely high-dimension space. This theory views us, and all objects, as ultimately constituted out of the wave function, and though we seem to occupy three dimensions, the fundamental spatial framework of quantum worlds consists of many more dimensions. Alyssa Ney argues for and advances this view, with the goal of making a case for how this theory how it might be applied to more other relativistic quantum theories, including quantum field theories. Her conclusion develops an account of how we as human beings might ultimately see ourselves and the objects around us as constituted out of the wave function.

PrefaceAcknowledgementsChapter 1: A Preliminary Case for Wave Function Realism1.1 Wave Function Representations in Quantum Mechanics1.2 The Measurement Problem1.3 Orthodox Quantum Mechanics1.4 Quantum Mechanics Without Measurement1.5 Wave Function Realism1.6 A Higher-Dimensional RealityChapter 2: The Argument from Entanglement2.1 Entanglement as the Characteristic Feature of Quantum Theories2.2 The Necessity of Wave Function Realism2.3 Rivals: The Primitive Ontology Approach2.4 Rivals: Holisms2.5 Rivals: Ontic Structural Realism2.6 Rivals: Spacetime State Realism2.7 Rivals: The Multi-field Approach2.8 The Contingency of Wave Function RealismChapter 3: The Virtues of Separability and Locality3.1 The Case for Wave Function Realism3.2 Separability3.3 Separability and Wave Function Realism3.4 A Challenge3.5 Concepts of Locality3.6 Quantum Nonlocality3.7 Locality and Wave Function Realism3.8 Avoiding Nonlocality with Nonseparability3.9 Motivating a Local Metaphysics3.10 In Defense of IntuitionsChapter 4: Wave Function Realism in a Relativistic Setting4.1 Removing Idealization4.2 Five Critiques4.3 Wave Function Realism for Relativistic Quantum Theories4.4 Interpretations and Interpretational Frameworks4.5 Response to Objections4.6 Wave Function Realism in the Limit of Physical TheorizingChapter 5: Must an Ontology for Quantum Theories Contain Local Beables?5.1 The Constitution Objection5.2 Doing Without Macroscopic Objects5.3 The Threat of Empirical Incoherence5.4 Primitive Ontologies and Local Beables5.5 Perception and the MacroscopicChapter 6: The Causal Role of Macroscopic Objects6.1 The Macro-Object Problem6.2 An Initial Proposal6.3 Monton's Challenge6.4 Albert's Proposal6.5 Against Functionalism6.6 The Decoherence Strategy6.7 From Simulation to ConstitutionChapter 7: A Solution to the Macro-Object Problem7.1 A Constitutive Explanation in Two Stages7.2 The Role of Grounding7.3 Recovering Three Dimensionality via Symmetry Considerations: Answering Monton's Challenge7.4 Part and Wholes7.5 Partial Instantiation7.6 Tables and Chairs and the Rest7.7 Finding the World in the Wave FunctionPostscript: An Incredulous StareReferences