Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain proposes a new legal and institutional framework for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its proposal is designed to remedy the widely acknowledged breakdown of the architecture of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on which we can no longer rely for global nuclear security.First, Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation defines the distinctively dangerous character of contemporary nuclear risk and explains why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty no longer provides a viable foundation for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. It then sets out the reforms needed in order to limit the radical increase in availability, for rogue governments and terrorists, of nuclear weapons related material and technology. Garvey proposes a new counterproliferation architecture, to be built on presently available scientific, legal, and institutional resources, which could achieve a critical reduction of nuclear risk and an expanded deterrence. Guiding principles for establishing this new architecture are formulated, including, most importantly, the principal mechanism for implementation, a United Nations Security Council Counterproliferation Resolution applying equally for all states.This book presents what may be our best opportunity to secure a profoundly more effective global nuclear security and counter the world's current course to a catastrophic nuclear detonation.

I. IntroductionA. The Need for a New Counterproliferation FoundationB. The Old Grand Bargain Breakdowni. The Goal of Nuclear Disarmamentii. The Flawed Nexus of Nuclear Disarmament andNuclear CounterproliferationC. Legitimacy; The Challenge of Asymmetric Possession of Nuclear WeaponsII. Futility of Nuclear Risk Management in a Purely Consensual RegimeA. Nuclear TerrorismB. State-to-State Nuclear Weapons RiskC. Risk Reduction by ConsentIII. Security Council Mandate of Universal StandardsA. 'Global Legislation' by the United Nations Security Councili. The Security Council as Global Legislatorii. The Legal Debateiii. The Legal Debate Enlightened by Political Realismiv. Counterproliferation as Best Prospect for Security Council LegislationB. Counterproliferation Beyond Current 'Legislation'C.Universal Standardsi. Nuclear Security as an Independent International Interestii. No Classification of Statesiii. International Administration of Universal StandardsIV. Elements of an Effective Counterproliferation ArchitectureA. Expanding Deterrence; An International Nuclear Forensics Data Banki. Contemporary Nuclear Forensics Capabilityii. Expanded Deterrenceiii. The Legal and Institutional Empowerment of Nuclear ForensicsB. The Internationalization of Counterproliferation Intelligencei. The Incongruity of National Intelligence Resources and Transnational Nuclear Riskii. The Imperative for International Institutionalization of Intelligenceiii. FeasibilityC. Export-Import Controli. The Club that Cannot Counter-Proliferateii. Institutionalization of Export-Import Controls under Security Council MandateD. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel CycleE. Interdiction of Nuclear Weapons Related Transport; The Proliferation Security Initiativei. Counterproliferation Designed to be Least Legal; 'An Activity, Not an Organization'ii. Interface of the Proliferation Security Initiative and International Lawa. Coastal State Jurisdictionb. High Seas Jurisdictionc. Self-Defenseiii. Institutionalization of the Proliferation Security Initiative under Security Council Mandate; Legitimacy and EffectivenessV. ComplianceVI. Political WillVII. Conclusion